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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Apparat delight 
Following his reelection as President, Vladimir Putin authorized a decree 
"streamlining" his Kremlin administration. Of the 2,000 personnel who could be 
cut from the apparat rolls according to this decree, approximately 10-12% or 200 
to 250 persons will be cut, although Kremlin Chief of Staff, Dmitri Medvedev, 
cautions, "There will be no arithmetical approach to staff numbers." (1) 
 
Whatever the numbers, the structure of the administration has undergone some 
resculpting. The Staff side of the administration, still led by Medvedev, will 
become rather shallow with only two co-equal deputy chiefs rather than the 
previous first deputy chief and the multiple deputy positions. Most of the former 
deputies have been moved into the consultation and advisory sectors as 
"presidential aides." The majority of the presidential advisers have retained their 
posts. 
 
The changes to the Directorates however, reveal that structurally, this reform is 
more than mere cosmetic surgery. The reamalgamating of similarly themed tasks 
suggests a President who no longer needs to ride herd over competing interests 
within his team — equivalent jobs whose functions nominally duplicate each 
other, but in reality were just equally ineffective organs, was a hallmark of the 
Yel’tsin-era approach to nomenklatura disputes. Putin, on the other hand, has 
merged sectors like the Press Service and Information Directorate into one 
agency (with Press Spokesman Aleksei Gromov gaining control of both, and 
former Information Directorate Head Sergei Yastrzhembsky out in the cold — 
well, off to Europe in any event). (2) 
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It does seem premature, despite the reconfiguring of the Directorates, to declare 
an end to Kremlin factional infighting. The two co-equal deputies, Igor Sechin and 
Vladislav Surkov, are long-identified representatives of the two most visible and 
contentious of the Kremlin clans, the Siloviki and the heirs of the Yel’tsin Family. 
The question inevitably follows: What’s up for grabs? That issue will be resolved 
as soon as it is determined just what sectors the Kremlin Administration Staff will 
oversee, and therefore have the power to control. (The facile division of 
responsibilities of the Kremlin Apparat and Government between politics and 
economics does not manage to convey the economic boon represented by the 
"supervision" of the political.) 
 
This brings us to the most notable of Putin’s adjustments to the Government and 
Kremlin Apparat: the creation of a vacuum, an absence of struggle between the 
Ministers and the Kremlin Staff. As Putin himself noted when he announced his 
decree on restructuring the Kremlin Staff, times have changed. "That 
administration [Yel’tsin’s] was born as the headquarters of a revolution." (3) 
 
The Young Turks of the early Yel’tsin reforms occupied both government and 
Kremlin posts. When the Supreme Soviet threatened to halt the "Shock therapy" 
reforms through out-moded constitutional mechanisms, Yel’tsin protected his 
reformers by shuffling them in and out of Kremlin positions — untouchable by 
Khasbulatov or other legislative dissenters. When Yel’tsin was finally forced into 
compromise on the composition of his Council of Ministers, he (and/or his staff) 
created structures within the Kremlin which duplicated the functions of the 
Government’s Staff and insisted that all decisions be vetted by both 
administrations. 
 
What appeared to be gross bureaucratic replication was, in fact, one of the only 
forms of oversight available to the reformers, the only channel to achieve 
implementation of their reforms without pesky parliamentary interference. 
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Unfortunately, as Yel’tsin grew less enamoured of the reforms themselves, and 
more reliant on Kremlin staffers, the feared war of bureaucracies devolved into a 
grasping snatch of national assets. The differences dividing a gung-ho economic 
reformer, from an enterprising entrepreneur turned oligarch, from a wealthy 
former Communist Party official morphed into a question of individual appeal or 
personal peccadilloes. With that, the Kompromat wars swung into gear — 
Russian politics today still suffer from the effects of the competition between 
icons and images, instead of ideas. 
 
When Putin jokes about finishing the ‘revolutionary’ mentality of the Kremlin, he 
refers primarily to ending the need to personalize the pursuit of reforms. He has 
set lofty economic goals (and I’m sure the Commission for Doubling the GDP is 
on top of that), but he does not identify either himself or his Presidency by 
economic accomplishments or liberalization. There is no longer a bastion of 
economic reform attacked from all sides by the red belt communists, "brown-
shirt" fascists, or colorless zealots. Putin has declared a "time out" for Russian 
politics, which, while admittedly depriving society of the vibrancy of a robust 
exchange of ideas, has at least encouraged the Presidential Administration to 
release its double grip on the Council of Ministers. Nothing more to fear from 
parliamentary oversight of government personnel and policy as enshrined in the 
Constitution — the President has the Parliament under control. 
 
Dmitri Kozak, the alleged author of these reforms, obviously wanted to make the 
point that there was to be a clear-cut boundary between the Kremlin and the 
Government, between political planning/implementation and economic 
planning/implementation. Hence, the Economic Department of the President’s 
Staff, the lead-lined room of the economic reformers’ bunker of yore, has been 
excised from the Kremlin. The Economic Department melds into the Experts 
Department (and oh, how many experts there are!), and the Government will 
have to sink or swim on its own economic accomplishments. 
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More on government renewal 
Lest the demarcation between government and Kremlin spheres be overdrawn, it 
is important to bear in mind that the ideological architect of these reform plans is 
the former First Deputy Head of the Kremlin Staff, Dmitri Kozak. After tackling 
Judicial reform and Regional restructuring, Kozak is taking aim at the corruption 
rampant in the bureaucratic organizations, or perhaps his goal is simply to make 
them more responsive to the top-down order Putin favors. 
 
New numbers on the magnitude of the government reform suggest a 20 percent 
cut in civil servants from within the federal bureaucracy. (4) The number of 
ministries and deputy prime ministers has already been slashed, now Kozak is 
making clear that the cuts will continue deep into each ministry. The nine 
ministries under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister will be restricted to only 2 
deputy ministers apiece (or 18 in total), down from a previous 250 deputy 
ministers. The 250 departments headed by each of the former deputy ministers 
will be slashed by more than half, to 100. Each department however, will have a 
staff of between 80 to 100 persons. Government commissions will likewise be 
trimmed from the current 220 commissions to "no more than 10," according to 
Kozak. (5) The plan, of course, contains a provision to increase the salaries of 
those remaining civil servants, in order to make corruption less appealing. 
 
Kozak and his own staff (size unknown) are also taking on another serious 
auditing project: not only are they revising the structure and staffing of the 
government and Kremlin administrations, but they also intend to carry out a 
thorough inventory of the government’s physical property. The Kozak plan calls 
for the savings from personnel cuts, utility bills (on excess office space), and 
similar cost saving devices to be used to increase salaries for those apparatchiks 
left in place (also in the hope of curtailing bribery within government structures), 
and severance pay for those let go. (6) 
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A final interesting element of the Kozak reforms: They do not apply to the 
"power" organs. The Big Five ministries (Defense, Interior, Justice, Foreign and 
Emergency Situations), which report directly to the President, were not included 
in Kozak’s reform plan. Granted, the power ministries have had special status at 
varying times: Yel’tsin’s own reform plans periodically pulled some of the security 
agencies or guards within presidential purview, usually in order to protect its 
leadership from prying legislative eyes, or in an attempt to ensure loyalty to the 
President in divisive times. This recreation of Yel’tsin’s model however, is an 
intriguing note at a time when Putin is roundly criticized for his reliance on and 
advancement of siloviki. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Argumenty i fakty, No. 13, 31 Mar 04; What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
Interfax, (1513 GMT, 30 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring International Reports via Lexis-
Nexis) notes that Yastrzhembsky has been appointed an "aide" to the Russian 
President as special representative of the R.F. President for the development of 
relations with the E.U. 
(2) Nezavisimaya gazeta, No. 62, 29 Mar 04; What the Papers Say via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(3) Moscow Times, 2 Apr 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Is the MVD the new target? 
In November 2003, there was suspicion that the departure of Boris Gryzlov from 
his post at the Interior Ministry would lead to an FSB takeover. Some reports 
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indicated that Gryzlov’s Deputy, Rashid Nurgaliyev, would be nominated for the 
position. (1) Those suspicions now appear to have been confirmed. 
 
On 9 March, several weeks after President Putin’s election victory, Nurgaliyev 
indeed was appointed as "interim" Interior Minister. (2) In the weeks since then 
Putin has been scathingly critical of the MVD’s performance in all areas. 
Speaking to a gathering of senior officers on 26 March, the President "chastised" 
the MVD generals for failing to control Russia’s rising crime levels, which have 
grown by 9.1% in the last year alone. The total number of registered crimes in 
2003 was 2.756 million. Putin also indicated that he had little faith in the 
Ministry’s statistics because he believed that officers were "directly falsifying" 
them. (3) Putin attempted to point the MVD towards areas which need 
improvement. They should, he stated, focus on "priority directions," such as 
corruption, human trafficking and terrorism. He added that the MVD was "one of 
the key agencies," but that in order to become more efficient, it should trim those 
spheres of its activity which overlap with other Federal Agencies. (4) Putin’s 
meaning was clear: Become more efficient, or be forced into reform from above. 
By all accounts, criticism of the agency has been building for some time. 
According to Vremya novostei, the Interior Ministry has done little except "annoy 
the Kremlin" over the last few years. The same piece alleged that Boris Gryzlov 
had been ordered to propose reforms, but he had failed to do so. (4) 
 
That President Putin should mention the removal of overlapping functions is 
interesting, since the MVD has already lost its anti-drug directorate, which is now 
a separate agency run by Viktor Cherkesov, a former KGB officer loyal to Putin. 
Cherkesov has himself spoken about the MVD, stating that the ministry still has 
"an overflow of different functions and goals." (5) 
 
How much time does the Interior Ministry realistically have? Some kind of an 
answer might be found in the person of Boris Gryzlov’s successor. According to 
the MVD website, Nurgaliyev joined the KGB in 1981, serving first as an 
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investigative officer in his home region of Karelia in Northern Russia. 
Subsequently, he served as Head of the Medvezhyegorsk Regional Department, 
and Chief of the Anti-Terrorist Department for Karelia. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, he moved into counter-espionage and personal security, before 
heading the FSB’s Office of Drug Trafficking Control in the Department of 
Economic Security. Between 1999 and 2002, he served as Deputy Director of the 
FSB before being appointed First Deputy Minister of the Interior in the latter year. 
(6) Nurgaliyev is reportedly a close personal friend to FSB Director Patrushev, 
and as such, he has access to Putin’s inner circle. (7) What meaning can be 
drawn from Nurgaliyev’s appointment and Putin’s harsh warning to the MVD’s 
senior officers? It may be an ultimatum: Either reform and remain under FSB 
control with some small semblance of independence, or be subsumed totally. 
 
Evidence of discontent in Spetsnaz? 
Two weeks ago, Novaya gazeta received and chose to publish a letter which is 
bound to have caused consternation at the very highest levels. According to the 
newspaper, journalists have received three such letters in the past, signed 
anonymously by "Alpha Group Servicemen." (8) The report outlined the initial 
letters, which apparently allege that these elite commando troops are forced to 
act as menservants to senior officers, to organize shows for generals and guests, 
and to "ship caviar and sturgeons from Dagestan via Chkalovsky by planes," as 
"gifts for Generals of the Federal Security Service from Dagestani top brass," as 
well as performing menial landscaping tasks around their secret base. (9) The 
fourth letter, which has been published in segments outlines the state of 
desperation even among these supposed crack troops: "Unwilling to serve under 
palace generals, combat officers whose contracts expire, resign…Professionals 
are leaving, and all sorts of men are accepted in their place. Soldiers sign 
contracts and are promoted to warrant officers and given Moscow registrations. 
They are very convenient as subordinates: they never question even idiotic 
orders." (10) 
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Several days later, TV Station Channel One received unprecedented access to a 
Special Forces training base near Moscow. The reporters were permitted to 
speak to one former and one serving senior officer, Oleg Malyshev. Malyshev is 
apparently the unit's "senior officer for state training and information." The 
reporters were also allowed to describe (although briefly) the type of mission 
these men might be carrying out in Chechnya, and to describe the type of 
training they receive. (11) This event looked like a cynical ploy by the Kremlin to 
counter the allegations aired in Novaya gazeta’s piece, and to provide the 
impression that Spetsnaz units do not suffer the same problems as the regular 
army. Was it a mere coincidence that the date chosen for Channel One’s visit 
was the 60th anniversary of the Special Forces’ founding? 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) CCPR-Russian Federal Politics, 16 Nov 03 via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(2) RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly, "Cadres: Reshuffling the Siloviki?" Jonas 
Bernstein, 5 Feb 04, Volume 4, Number 4 via 
http://www.rferl.org/reports/rpw/2004/02/4-050204.asp. 
(3) The St. Petersburg Times, 26 Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(4) Vremya novostei, 11 Mar 04; via WPS via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(5) The Moscow Times, 26 Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(6) Biography of Rashid Gumarovich Nurgaliyev via 
http://eng.mvdrf.ru/index.php?docid=2. 
(7) CCPR-Russian Federal Politics, 16 Nov 03 via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(8) Novaya gazeta, 26 Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) BBC Monitoring, 27 Mar 04, Russian Channel TV One via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
 
Moscow prepares for NATO 
On the same day the induction of the seven newest North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) members was celebrated at the alliance’s headquarters in 
Brussels, there was also a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council. Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov represented Moscow at the 2 April gathering, for 
which the Kremlin has been setting the background through a series of its own 
meetings and public statements. Depicted on a map, the following enumeration 
of Russia’s diplomatic engagement and rhetoric over the past few weeks gives 
the impression that the Kremlin has been figuratively inspecting its defenses prior 
to the NATO advance. 
 
In March, the Kremlin directly engaged these newest Southeastern European 
NATO members. On 15 March, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Chizhov 
met with a visiting foreign ministry official from Slovenia, which is one of the four 
countries that Moscow is demanding sign the Agreement on Adaptation of the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) as it joins NATO. 
Then, beginning on 23 March, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation Council Mikhail Margelov led a Russian Duma delegation 
to Romania and Bulgaria. Despite Margelov’s cheerful description of the bilateral 
relationships, the Russian Ambassador to Bucharest, Aleksandr Tolkach, in an 
interview with the Romanian news agency Rusia la Zi, accused Romania of 
discriminating against Russian investors. (1) 
 
Moscow also gave one last reminder of its stance regarding the Baltic region. It 
completed the tit-for-tat diplomatic row by expelling a total of five Estonian and 
Lithuanian diplomats from Moscow on 22 and 30 March, respectively. 
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Additionally, the Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Ivanov, repeated Moscow’s 
suspicions about NATO’s military intentions in the Baltic states, stressing that 
"Russia closely follows NATO’s activities close to its borders and retains the right 
to respond appropriately if need be." (2) 
 
The recently reignited situation in Kosovo was an opportune moment for the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to place more demands on NATO. As 
Russian President Vladimir Putin dispatched Russian Minister for Emergencies, 
Sergei Shoigu, to Serbia to coordinate the delivery of assistance to the Kosovar-
Serb refugees, Lavrov announced that the Kosovo crisis, too, would make for 
"non-easy talk" at the NATO meeting in Brussels. (3) The Russian MFA issued a 
statement that Moscow was ready to work with the contact group on Kosovo and 
with the United Nations Security Council but suggested that NATO’s efforts there 
had proven unsuccessful. It also said that given the current situation, talks about 
Kosovo’s future political status were out of the question for now. (4) 
 
Moscow’s misgivings about NATO intentions go beyond the Baltics and Kosovo. 
Following a Nezavisimaya gazeta report of "a massive U.S. military-diplomatic 
assault on Baku," (5) the Russian Duma announced that it was planning a "joint 
closed-door session of the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security Committees on 
25 March, to discuss the ramifications of NATO expansion including the 
possibility of a U.S. troop presence in Azerbaijan." (6) The chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee of the Russian Duma, Konstantin Kosachev, raised 
questions about U.S. plans for military bases in Bulgaria, the need for them, and 
their threat to the CFE Treaty. He said that this too would be raised at the 2 April 
NATO meeting. (7) Moreover, the Russian MFA criticized Ukraine for ratifying an 
agreement with NATO that it describes as signifying nearly automatic Ukrainian 
support for future NATO operations. The agreement potentially grants NATO 
virtually unrestricted access to Ukrainian territory. (8) 
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In addition to the diplomatic finger-pointing described above, the Kremlin also 
reaffirmed the status of some of its counter-NATO relationships. Huddling one 
last time before NATO arrived on their doorstep, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States foreign ministers held talks in Minsk on 26 March to discuss 
the future of the CIS. On the bilateral level, Vice-Speaker of the Russian Duma, 
Sergei Baburin, visited Tehran on 19 March to reiterate the MFA’s plans to take 
steps toward strengthening ties between Russia and Iran. He assured his Iranian 
hosts that Foreign Minister Lavrov had taken into account any possible U.S. 
reaction to such steps. 
 
Russia's First Deputy Foreign Minister Valeri Loshchinin arrived in Beijing on 24 
March for talks with Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo. In addition to 
discussing plans for the upcoming visit of President Putin to Beijing in October 
2004, the meetings focused on mutual concerns in Central Asia, in the CIS 
region and in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
 
Although there are no indications of an attempt to breath life into the theoretically 
appealing Russia-Iran-China alliance, Moscow clearly remains attracted to the 
benefits of working together with Tehran and Beijing as a counterforce to the 
U.S. and NATO presence in their common backyard. Moreover, this diplomatic 
activity and rhetoric over the past month betrays Moscow’s frustration with having 
to acknowledge the new European geo-political reality following NATO’s and the 
European Union’s respective enlargements. Indeed, at the 2 April NATO-Russia 
Council meeting, Lavrov reminded the alliance, "We have never been in favor of 
NATO’s expansion. (…) [W]e accepted the expansion of the alliance as a fact, 
even though we do not welcome either the first, or the second or the third wave 
of this process." (9) 
 
Primakov in Tblisi 
Not to be outdone by his one-time political ally, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, 
Yevgeni M. Primakov has also gone to Georgia. Whereas Luzhkov arrived in 
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Batumi in the heat of the most recent crisis between Adzharia and Tblisi, and 
reportedly played a key role in its resolution, Primakov’s 23 March visit was 
initially billed as being private in nature. Primakov, as the Russian Centre TV 
reported, arrived with friends and family, including the Georgian, Moscow-based 
film director Georgiy Daneliya. In the same report, however, the commentator 
acknowledged, "The real reason for [Primakov’s] visit is unknown." (10) 
 
In January 2004, speaking in his capacity as the President of the Russian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Primakov laid out his position on Georgian-
Russian relations at a conference in Moscow. Calling for a normalization of those 
relations, he stated, "We also need to contribute to [the process of creating 
neighborly relations] and work out a clear strategy that will really promote the 
normalization of Tbilisi relations with Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adzharia 
recognizing Georgia’s territorial integrity. (… ) [I]t is difficult. However, Russia has 
vast experience in peacekeeping activities" (11) — a fact Georgians know all too 
well. 
 
Primakov likely delivered his message personally to Georgian President 
Saakashvili with whom the Centre TV report showed him and Daneliya dining in 
Tblisi. While acknowledging that a diversified Georgian foreign policy is only to 
be expected, Primakov asserted that "if Georgia's natural movement towards 
Europe and the United States includes an anti-Russian component, the result will 
certainly be negative." (12) Additionally, in what may or may not have been 
perceived by the Georgian President as a compliment, Primakov compared 
Saakashvili to Putin, saying they both "speak openly and say what they think, … 
do not use cunning tricks and do not conceal their thoughts." (13) 
 
Contrary to Centre TV’s report, the Georgian website, Civil Georgia, described 
Primakov’s visit as a business trip during which he would also be meeting with 
the Georgian prime and foreign ministers as well as with his counterpart, 
President of the Georgian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Erosi 
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Kitsmarishvili. (14) In either case, the Kremlin’s attitude toward the future of their 
relations was underscored by the chosen messenger — Primakov's lengthy 
record is well-known. Adding to the message’s effectiveness was the timing of 
his meeting with Saakashvili, on the heels of the latest crisis with Batumi, and 
just prior to the 28 March Georgian parliamentary elections and the 31 March 
meeting between the Georgian and Russian defense ministers in Moscow. 
 
Lavrov: Russia has no right to exert pressure on its neighbors 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Sergei Lavrov, wrote an article in the 
Wall Street Journal on 31 March 2004. (15) In it, he refuted the idea that Russia 
had any imperial ambitions and tried to sell Russia’s planned reintegration of the 
CIS as "facilitat[ing] the level of stability there." Although he did acknowledge that 
the territory of the former Soviet Union is a "sphere of her vital interests dictated 
by her very history," he expressed hope that the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) would not turn into a "zone of rivalry for ‘spheres of influence’." 
 
Russian President Vladimir Putin has also recently addressed the direction of his 
second-term foreign policy. In a 23 March ceremony for new ambassadors to 
Russia, Putin stated, "From now on, Russia will play an active and responsible 
part in the world processes." While it would be tempting to ask what kind of role 
Russia has been playing up to this point, Putin went on, "We will continue to 
pursue an honest and open policy towards our neighbors and the whole of the 
world community. Our priorities in the international affairs remain unchanged." 
(16) 
 
Those priorities evidently are led by the continuing plan to reintegrate the CIS. It 
is clear that a new foreign minister does not necessarily result in a new foreign 
policy. Lavrov, however, admits in his article that Moscow’s historical ties to the 
CIS do not give it the right to "exert pressure on her neighbors." Now that would 
be something new. 
 
 14 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Evenimentol Zilei, 24 Mar 04; FBIS Report, 24 Mar 04 via World News 
Connection . 
(2) ITAR-TASS, 25 Mar 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0325 via World News Connection. 
(3) ITAR-TASS, 29 Mar 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0329 via World News Connection. 
(4) ITAR-TASS, 23 Mar 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0324 via World News Connection. 
(5) 23 Mar 04; FBIS Media Analysis, 26 Mar 04 via World News Connection. 
(6) Parlamentskaya gazeta, 25 Mar 04; FBIS Media Analysis, 26 Mar 04 via 
World News Connection. 
(7) BTA, 30 Mar 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0330 via World News Connection. 
(8) Vremya novosti, 22 Mar 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0322 via World News 
Connection. 
(9) ITAR-TASS, 2 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(10) 23 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(11) Website of the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 30 
Jan 04 < http://eng.tpprf.ru/ru/main/news>. 
(12) CENTRE TV, 23 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(13) 23 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(14) Civil Georgia, 24 Mar 04 (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=6509). 
(15) Wall Street Journal, 31 Mar 04 via Johnson’s Russia List #8146, 31 Mar 04. 
(16) ITAR-TASS, 23 Mar 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0324 via World News Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
LEGISLATURE 
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Not in my back yard 
There had been concern that, given the results of the December 2003 
parliamentary election and the March 2004 presidential election, the 
administration would ride roughshod over the people, and exhibit a tendency 
toward authoritarianism. Not so, assured the rosy-eyed optimists — surely such 
support will only allow the president and "his" political party, United Russia, to 
pass much-needed reforms. 
 
Well, in its first four months in session, the State Duma has exhibited, as some 
feared, a tendency to remove rights for the people its deputies purportedly 
represent. And, in the latest move, it is working aggressively toward even 
removing the people’s right to protest against its activities. In this, the Duma is 
not acting alone; the proposal to restrict assemblies comes from the government. 
 
Last week the Duma began debate on a draft law that would restrict where 
rallies, meetings or marches could take place, banning public assemblies 
adjacent to the president’s residence and government buildings... such as the 
Duma. Gatherings also would be prohibited near highways, bridges, schools, 
religious centers, concert halls, and stadiums, among other locales. Deputy 
Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin explained that the restrictions are not meant to limit 
citizens’ rights to have their voices heard; rather, he said, it is designed for the 
"more effective safety of citizens." (1) While the proposal has the support of 
United Russia, which guarantees its passage provided the president continues to 
pursue the measure, opposition could be heard elsewhere in the Duma, from the 
Communists, Rodina, and the Liberal Democratic Party. In the first reading, the 
bill was approved by a vote of 294 to 137. 
 
While the passage of such a restriction would, clearly, limit the voices of dissent 
anywhere they might cause a distraction, it is questionable how loud those voices 
could be anyway. A protest against the proposed bill gathered only a small 
number of individuals. Since the protest was held without the approval of 
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authorities, the organizer, YABLOKO’s Sergei Mitrokhin, and at least two of his 
supporters were detained briefly. (2) Despite the small numbers of protesters at 
the rally, opposition was heard in the halls of the Duma, and the lower hours 
decided to amend the proposal for the second reading, which is scheduled for 28 
April. Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov announced the planned amendments would 
remove the restriction on assemblies outside seats of state power, although he 
said the ban on rallies outside the presidential residence would remain in the 
draft bill. (3) 
 
However, restriction of assemblies was not the only item on the Duma agenda 
that would erode the few faltering steps Russia is making toward a civil society. 
The head of the newly—created Federal Agency for the Press and Mass 
Communication, Mikhail Seslavinsky, (4) reported that the first document he will 
sign will be a letter opposing United Russia's new legislative initiative that would 
restrict media coverage of terrorist attacks to official statements. "It is impossible 
to imagine journalists reporting on tragic events only after an operative center is 
set up and official comments are released," Seslavinsky said. (5) Perhaps 
"impossible to imagine" for him, but obviously quite easy to imagine for the party 
of power. 
 
The Russian human rights commissioner, Vladimir Lukin, also is commenting on 
a draft law — this one allows for the arrest of persons for up to 30 days without 
any charges brought against them if they’re suspected of terrorist activities. The 
bill has been approved after the second reading, Lukin noted, and his staff is 
going to suggest the postponement of corresponding amendments to the Penal 
Code. "There should be a clear dividing line between the war on terrorism and all 
that is connected with the observance of human rights," he said. (6) 
 
Still, the citizens of Russia can try to find solace in the priority bills as 
enumerated by deputy speaker Vladimir Pekhtin. The United Russia faction, 
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otherwise known as the Duma, reportedly will focus on improving the country’s 
economy and bringing eventual prosperity to every segment of the population. (7) 
 
It’s all our backyard 
The residents of the Komi-Perm autonomous district and the Perm region soon 
will be sharing government structures and budgets, as the Duma passed the 
presidential bill on the formation of the new Perm Territory in three readings on 
19 March, with 423 deputies for the bill, and one abstention noted. The residents 
of the two areas had approved a referendum on the merger in December 2003. 
(8) The purpose of the merger, according to Duma Deputy Andrei Klimov, is to 
speed up the region’s socio-economic development. (9) Of course, "speed up" is 
a relative term: The Perm territory will not come into existence officially until 
December 2005, and the union of budgets —one of Russia’s donor regions, and 
one of its aid recipients — will not occur for an additional year. 
 
The Federation Council approved the merger a week after the Duma did. Oleg 
Chirkunav, the former deputy chairman of the Council’s Budget Committee who 
currently serves as acting head of the Perm Oblast, reportedly will be appointed 
temporary acting head of the new region by presidential edict. Chirkunov told the 
media that his team will coordinate the merger of the executive organs by 2005, 
and merge the legislatures and budgets by 2006. (10) 
 
This may not be the first of many mergers. Another proposed union, of the 
republic of Altai and the neighboring Altai territory, will not take place, if the 
republic’s state assembly has anything to say about it. El Kurultai, the Altai 
republic’s assembly, announced that it would not call a referendum on combining 
the two entities. The assembly and the republican government have repeatedly 
refused to consider the proposal, despite the support of the Altai territory’s 
leadership. (11) 
 
Too many chiefs? There’s one less, now 
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The change in Russia’s government has been a boon to Duma Speaker Boris 
Gryzlov. He has settled into his leadership position quite comfortably, and has 
used the governmental appointment of Aleksandr Zhukov, who had been one of 
two first deputy Duma speakers, as a means of downgrading part of the Duma 
hierarchy. Now there is only one person on the first deputy speaker tier—Lyubov 
Sliska. 
 
On 26 March, Vladimir Katrenko, who had served as first deputy chairman of the 
United Russia faction, was elected new deputy speaker of the Duma, filling in the 
vacancy Zhukov’s departure created, sort of. (12) He will join fellow United 
Russia members Georgi Boos, Vyacheslav Volodin, Oleg Morozov, Vladimir 
Pekhtin and Artur Chilingarov, as well as Valentin Kuptsov (Communist Party), 
Sergei Baburin (Rodina) and Vladimir Zhirinovsky (Liberal Democratic Party). 
(13) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ITAR-TASS, 1554 GMT, 30 Mar 04 via World News Connection. 
(2) Los Angeles Times, 1 Apr 04 via Johnson’s Russia List #8148, 1 Apr 04. 
(3) Moscow Times, 5 Apr 04 via Johnson's Russia List, #8151. 
(4) See The NIS Observed, 24 Mar 04. 
(5) ITAR-TASS, 0848 GMT, 22 Mar 04 via World News Connection. 
(6) ITAR-TASS, 1155 GMT, 25 Mar 04 via World News Connection. 
(7) ITAR-TASS, 1433 GMT, 19 Mar 04 via World News Connection. 
(8) ITAR-TASS, 0909 GMT, 19 Mar 04 via World News Connection. 
(9) ITAR-TASS, 1609 GMT, 19 Mar 04 via World News Connection. 
(10) Izvestiya, 26 Mar 04 via World News Connection. 
(11) ITAR-TASS, 0857 GMT, 29 Mar 04 via World News Connection. 
(12) ITAR-TASS, 0804 GMT, 26 Mar 04 via World News Connection. 
(13) Global News Wire, 30 Dec 03, Radio Free Europe via Lexis-Nexis; Prime-
Tass News Agency, 5 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Kris Beasly and Paul Lyons 
 
Sergei Ivanov gains control of arms sales procurement 
President Vladimir Putin apparently has fulfilled another phase of his agenda to 
reform the Russian military and its supporting industrial complex, and Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov seems to have succeeded in gaining control of the arms 
export system and the "state defense order" (R&D and procurement) process. (1) 
 
In both his 2000 National Security Concept and his 2003 White Paper, "Urgent 
Issues Regarding the Development of the Russian Armed Forces," Putin pointed 
out the need to reduce and rationalize the military-industrial infrastructure without 
losing any important research and development or production capabilities. At the 
same time, he wanted to bring it more securely under state control. While the 
vast network of companies has been encouraged and supported by the state to 
increase its arms export dramatically in order to provide hard-currency cash and 
pay for research and development programs for Russia, there has been little 
planned restructuring to improve efficiency. Much of the vast complex (more than 
4 million workers in Soviet times) still exists, but either runs very inefficiently or 
produces consumer goods as well as military items. 
 
Little has changed, except by chance and attrition, since 1990. Three factors 
contributed to the industry's stagnation: 1) the managers were powerful and 
experienced political infighters; 2) the General Staff did not want to close any 
plants in order to retain as much mobilization potential as possible; and 3) the 
whole system was managed by various sectors of the government, which often 
had other priorities and couldn't cohere on a unified plan for military production 
on the whole. 
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Putin, however, has made several attempts to keep the best design firms and 
production plants under state control, giving Russia an independent defense 
industrial capability, and to convert the rest of the production capabilities to other 
uses. Last year, the first six of 40 planned "holdings" were created. Each holding 
was headed by a major state-run company that was permitted to coalesce under 
one "holding company" all the design, production and testing elements needed to 
make a specific type of product, such as fighters or artillery systems. (Examples 
include Sukhoi and Tactical Missile Arms.) (2) 
 
In 2001, Putin reinvigorated the Committee on Military-Technical Cooperation to 
govern the arms export process and a year ago, on 11 March 2003, Putin 
created the State Committee on the Defense Order (under the Defense Ministry) 
to orchestrate the annual State Defense Order. As is customary, these 
committees were composed of representatives of many competing 
bureaucracies, all fighting over the dwindling resources. (3) 
 
On 5 March 04, new Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov told the Duma that in order 
to make headway in implementing President Putin’s reform plans, "simply 
increasing the state defense order will not solve the problem of the defense 
sector," and that, "…structural changes will have to be carried out in the military-
industrial sector in the very near future, including the structure of defense 
orders." (4) On 9 March 04, President Putin signed another in a series of decrees 
that reorganized various parts of the federal executive. A large portion of that 
decree involved the Ministry of Defense. Under that decree, four new Federal 
Services were set up under the Ministry of Defense: 1) the Federal Service for 
Military-Technical Cooperation; 2) the Federal Service for the Defense Order; 3) 
the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control; and 4) the Federal Special 
Construction Agency. 
 
It now appears that Ivanov will have direct control of the organization managing 
arms sales. One big benefit is that he will have the ability to control both which 
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deals are approved and where the profits go. He will also have direct control of 
the group compiling the State Defense Order. In the sphere of military 
production, Ivanov and the Defense Ministry will set work priorities and control 
whatever resources are available to execute those tasks. (5) The actual 
production of military gear by the state industries will be controlled out of the 
Ministry of Industry and Energy through its various departments because, as 
promised by Deputy Prime Minister Boris Aleshin last October, President Putin 
also dissolved five state agencies with overlapping mandates: the Russian 
Aerospace Agency (see below), the Russian Shipbuilding Agency, the Russian 
Control Systems Agency, the Russian Conventional Arms Agency and the 
Russian Munitions Agency. Incidentally, the MOD also picked up responsibility 
for the agency in charge of construction of special military projects like missile 
silos, deeply buried command posts, etc. This used to be the domain of an 
entirely distinct set of Troops in the Armed Forces, but Putin streamlined them 
into a civilian agency subordinated to Ivanov. (6) 
 
The New Federal Space Agency 
In the same decree discussed above, Putin transformed Rosaviakosmos (the 
Russian Aviation and Space Agency) into the Federal Space Agency under the 
Ministry of Industry and Energy. In a sure sign of how close knit all things space 
are in Russia, the four-star general in charge of the Military Space Force, Anatoli 
Perminov, was named as the new head of the agency on 12 March. (7) Perminov 
was replaced by Lieutenant General Vladimir Popovkin as the Commander-in-
Chief of the Space Forces on 10 March. Popovkin is no stranger to the 
command, having served as Chief of Staff under Perminov. He is a long time 
space officer, having been an engineer at Baikonur and graduated from, among 
other institutes, Peter the Great military academy of the Strategic Missile Forces. 
(8) 
 
Source Notes: 
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Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(2) Izvestiya, 21 Feb 04;What the Papers Say (Defense and Security), 1 Mar 04 
via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(3) WPS Observer, 12 Mar 04; What the Papers Say (Defense and Security), 12 
Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(4) ITAR-TASS, 0841 GMT, 5 March 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0305 via World News 
Connection. 
(5) WPS Observer, 12 Mar 04; What the Papers Say (Defense and Security), 12 
Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(6) Izvestiya, 21 Feb 04; What the Papers Say (Defense and Security), 1 Mar 04 
via ISI Emerging Markets. 
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(8) Krasnaya zvezda, 17 Mar 04; What the Papers Say (Defense and Security), 
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The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Dept. of Defense or the 
United States government. 
 
NAVY 
Sphere of influence? 
While Russia's consternation with NATO expansion continues to gain traction 
with each passing air patrol, the reality remains that Russia's impasse with NATO 
and its "near abroad" states is firmly rooted in diplomatic vestiges of the past and 
an uncertain vision of the future. While the principles of democracy cohere within 
former Warsaw Pact members and satellite states of the former Soviet Union, the 
opposite holds true within Russia itself. Equally disturbing to Russia is the 
inclusion of seven new member nations in NATO, each of which brings their 
"niche" capabilities into the collective fold. Operating independently, they would 
each face the persistence of the renewed Russian imperialism central to the 
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Putin mantra. Although Russia has quelled disputes with Ukraine over the Kerch 
Strait and vowed to remain neutral during the Georgian dispute with Adjaria, the 
Russian Navy is once again flying its colors within sight of the nascent NATO-
member states as well as those aspiring to follow suit. 
 
As tensions mounted within Georgia, the Black Sea Fleet put to sea some 20 
warships, 42 auxiliary vessels and 7,325 servicemen as a "deterrent for the case 
of unforeseen contingency." (1) However, an apparent de-escalation of the 
Adjarian crisis has led the Black Sea Fleet to attend to its scheduled April training 
regimen. Admiral Masorin, Black Sea Fleet Commander, stated that "this will be 
a conclusive inspection of the ships’ operational readiness following winter 
training…it is planned to land mariners at the Kerch Peninsula. ‘This is our 
training ground, which we are using in compliance with the agreements’." (2) 
Black Sea Fleet operations in the Kerch Strait area come hard on the heels of 
negotiations, which produced draft agreements between Russia’s Deputy 
Foreign Minister Viktor Kalyuzhny and Ukraine’s Deputy Foreign Minister 
Aleksandr Motsik. This is still, however, an ongoing dialogue between the two 
sides, which focuses on "the Russian-Ukrainian border in the Sea of Azov, on the 
border in the Kerch Strait, and on partition of territorial seas, continental shelf and 
economic zones in the Black Sea." (3) Training aside, the recent deployments in 
the vicinity of Georgia and Ukraine seem to be part of Russia’s renewed attempts 
to flex its military muscle in a place once considered Russia's sphere of 
influence, perhaps in the hope of reviving that past. 
 
Ukraine, nonetheless, wasn’t dissuaded from holding its own exercise. Ukraine 
recently completed Sea Border 2004 to "polish cooperation between control 
bodies of the Defense Ministry, the Interior Troops, the Emergencies Ministry, the 
State Border Guard Service and the Ukrainian security service during a state of 
emergency." (4) The focus of the naval forces during the exercises was to 
conduct mining, anti-aircraft, and search and rescue operations as well as to 
conduct a landing operation on the Saki airdrome. 
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Forgone Principles versus Future Potentials 
The ability of any military force to conduct deterrence, combat or training 
operations is dependent on its combat readiness. To Russia's credit, the recent 
Far East Staff Exercises and the strategic staff exercises earlier this year have 
brought significant training and command and control dividends. A more visceral 
derivative of these exercises has resulted from their clear depiction of the clash 
between Russian "Great Power" rhetoric, and the harsh realities of combat 
readiness deterioration. 
 
Focusing on the Navy, the spectacle posed by the Northern Fleet missile firing 
mishaps in February, the K-159 towing incident, the KURSK tragedy, and reports 
of persistent readiness shortfalls all highlight the gulf between perceived and 
actual readiness. 
 
Comments made recently by officials of the Council for Foreign and Defense 
Policy (CFDP) depict the growing concern as to whether forces once fashioned 
"for the battle of the first salvo" can pass muster for prolonged and more 
technologically-laden conflicts of the future. Asked whether or not Russia has 10-
15 years to modernize its force in light of recent catastrophes in the Northern 
Fleet, Nikolai Vasilyevich of the CFDP noted, "In the previous years the Defense 
Ministry tried to convince the leadership of the country to provide at least 3.5 
percent of the GDP for modernization of weaponry. The state always agreed with 
this but never did anything practical. For example, this year it’s about 2.68 
percent of the GDP. In the previous years the industry was underfunded 
tremendously. If we try to go back to the arms program that is already obsolete, it 
has to be revised radically." (5) Given the musings coming from the Defense 
Ministry regarding NATO expansion, Russia can not afford to wait the 10-15 
years required to modernize its force effectively. 
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Sergei Arbatov of the CFDP discussed the politico-military issues of NATO 
expansion and the pressing need to modernize Russia’s forces. He states, "I 
think I will not make a mistake if I say that 70 percent of our armed forces and 
resources, including nuclear weapons, and maybe even more, up to 90 percent, 
are geared to the preparation for a possible conflict with the West. It’s hard for us 
to allocate sufficient resources to deal with real threats that already kill people, 
not those that may cause some foreign political complications in the future…this 
is the paradox that often happens in politics: the real threats to us are in one 
direction but the overwhelming share of resources is spent on something 
completely different." (6) 
 
Adding to the conundrum is Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov’s pronouncements in 
his recent article, "Russia Has Two Allies — Its Army and Navy," extracted from 
Russian in Global Affairs magazine. Ivanov asserts that the "Russian Armed 
Forces should be able to successfully fulfill tasks in two armed conflicts… 
simultaneously, as well as conducting peacekeeping operations independently or 
as part of a multinational force." (7) 
 
Three strikes and you’re… 
The recent dismal record of performance by naval forces begs the question of 
when Putin might set his sights on "reforming" the Admiralty. If President Putin’s 
recent meetings with Fleet Admirals subordinate to Commander of the Russian 
Navy, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, serve as a barometer, it’s growing 
increasingly probable that Admiral Kuroyedov’s days are numbered as Russia’s 
top admiral. 
 
Attempting to read the tea leaves for political signs in Russia is a formidable 
challenge. Nonetheless, the "indicators" seem to be lining up for the departure of 
Admiral Kuroyedov. Of late, President Putin met with Admiral Vladimir Masorin, 
Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, in Sochi where he "reported on the 
upcoming exercises and the current problems of the Black Sea Fleet to the 
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President." (8) The meeting holds particular significance if, as was reported at the 
time, President Putin favored Masorin for the post of Black Sea Fleet 
Commander in 2002. Admiral Kuroyedov flew into Sevastopol later the same day 
after the Masorin-Putin meeting, any further details were not forthcoming. 
 
In addition, Admiral Kuroyedov’s recent pronouncements that the Northern Fleet 
flagship, Peter the Great, "may blow up at any moment" ignited alarm not only 
over the impending danger, but the reality that the comments are part and parcel 
of Kuroyedov’s controversial style of defaming and marginalizing any potential 
successors to the Fleet Admiralship. Admiral Kuroyedov’s attack was not meant 
for the Peter the Great itself, but rather for its commanding officer, Admiral 
Vladimir Kasatonov. His animus for Kasatonov stems from criticism aimed at 
Kuroyedov during the investigation into the loss of the submarine K-159 last year. 
The disdain for Kuroyedov transcends the Admiral ranks. "Officers of the 
Northern Fleet do not like Kuroyedov. Many officers think that the commander-in-
chief’s activities are aimed against Admiral Gennadi Suchkov, Commander of the 
Northern Fleet, who was suspended in September 2003 until the end of the 
investigation of the K-159 shipwreck. Gennady Suchkov is an experienced 
officer, and could claim the post of the commander-in-chief of the Navy. Suchkov 
was suspended on Kuroyedov’s initiative.(9)" 
 
Of course, Kuroyedov’s actions against Fleet Commanders and potential 
successors are a well-honed skill. He dismissed the Northern Fleet Commander, 
Admiral Popov, for the KURSK catastrophe and the Black Sea Fleet 
Commander, Admiral Komoyedov was fired previously. Add the fact that Admiral 
Kuroyedov assigned himself to a commission to investigate the missile firing 
debacles of February 17-18 and one has to wonder, why is the Admiral of the 
Fleet engaged in such a commission in the first place? 
 
The answer is obvious. Admiral Kuroyedov has his eye on the rear view mirror 
and not on the road ahead. The irony of the situation is that the Russian Navy 
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needs just that, a conclusive report that stipulates that the current leadership, 
maintenance, training and budgets do not support the current or future objectives 
of the force. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
UKRAINE 
Who benefits from economic growth? 
The growth of the Ukrainian economy last year was unprecedented. The average 
salary grew by 23 percent, about 3.5 million Ukrainians had at least some form of 
pension increase, the government fulfilled and then over-fulfilled the state budget 
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for the first time. Ukraine was also excluded from the black list of countries, which 
are not combating money laundering — The Financial Action Task Force lifted its 
sanctions. (1) The outlook is rather bright, or so it seems… 
 
Despite the economic growth, more than 60% of Ukrainians live in poverty. Even 
with some increase, the minimum wage is still the bare minimum. Presently, it is 
only $44, which means many people live on little more than one dollar a day. The 
government seems to realize the severity of the situation and even declared 
overcoming poverty as its main goal. This year's new government program is 
called - "Consistency, Effectiveness, Responsibility." 
 
Some claim however, that the government was anything but responsible. It could 
have done much more with the money it had available. It could have increased 
wages by much more, it could have helped more Ukrainians get out of poverty. 
Some members of the opposition claim that in light of recent economic growth, 
the authorities allocated a substantial chunk of budgetary revenue for shadowy 
purposes. In particular, opposition MP Victor Pynzenyk accused the Ukrainian 
government of hiding 1.5bn dollars of budget revenues in 2003 and of 
understating receipts in 2004 by 1.9bn dollars. (2) Mr. Pynzenyk claimed that the 
government had the resources to raise wages to such occupation groups as 
doctors and teachers but refused to do so. The opposition member showed some 
convincing evidence that budgetary understatements had indeed taken place. 
For example, last year's budget was 75bn hryvnas (about 14bn dollars) and this 
year's estimated budget is 78.2 bn hryvnas, which is less than last year's, given a 
6.7 percent price growth. (3) With such phenomenal economic growth, as quoted 
by the authorities, a reduction of the state budget is indeed surprising. 
 
Mykola Azarov, First Deputy Prime Minister, refuted Pynzenyk accusations, 
stating that the budged was being implemented by 100 percent, meaning that all 
the resources the government has were being spent. He also added that all 
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budgets were served by the treasury, eliminating the possibility of spending funds 
contrary to the detailed budget sheets. 
 
The opposition bloc, Our Ukraine, organized the tent protest under the slogan 
"Stop Robbing People" outside the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. The protesters 
were demanding "taking 1.9 bn dollars of budget revenues out of the shadow 
sector and increasing pensions and wages for teachers, doctors and scientists." 
(4) The Ukrainian court found opposition tent protests illegal and banned Our 
Ukraine from creating a tent encampment near the Cabinet of Ministers. (5) 
 
Ethnic clashes in Crimea 
A crowd of Crimean Tatar youth smashed a bar in Simferopol on 23 March after 
a countryman was stabbed in the bar the same night. The attack was directed 
against ethnic Slavs (mainly Russians). Police arrested over 30 Tatars, who 
participated in the clash. Many of the victims were members of the growing 
community of skinheads in the Crimea. Only about a month ago, ethnic Tatars 
attacked a Russian television crew, which attempted to film the shabby 
residences of some Tatars. 
 
Tatars, who have lived in the Crimean peninsular since the 13th century and 
consider this to be their native land, were exiled by Stalin in 1944. Crimea's most 
valuable land is now owned predominantly by ethnic Russians and Ukrainians. 
(6) 
 
MOLDOVA 
Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin has proposed that the parliament remove 
article 170 from the Moldovan Penal code, which allows journalists' imprisonment 
of up to five years for defamation. "Maintaining a criminal punishment for 
calumny harms both the activity of the mass media… and the interests of 
citizens, which keep the right to interpret information and to decide whether it is 
correct," the president said. (7) 
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It is a noble and an unusual act for the president, but there is, of course, a 
catch... This measure, in no way, provides journalists with the freedom to write 
truthfully without fear of punishment. A provision in the Civil Code, which does 
not limit the size of fines for libel, still exists and is potentially more dangerous to 
the journalists. "If the president is truly interested in enforcing the international 
recommendations and promoting press freedom standards, he should propose 
an amendment to the Civil Code, too, " said Angela Sarbu, secretary of the 
Moldovan Media Working Group. (8) 
 
Journalists often have to spend their time and effort battling libel cases brought 
against them in court. In August 2003, for example, Boris Birstein (a Canadian 
journalist of Moldovan origin) filed a lawsuit against a Moldovan media group 
Flux, asking for over 100,000 dollars in payments for abusing his honor and 
dignity, and for inflicting financial damage. His actions were triggered by 
journalists' investigation of an agreement between the businessman and the 
Moldovan government, under which Birstein's company received a certain share 
of the money paid for each passport issued by the Department of Information 
Technologies. (9) 
 
Punitive measures, which are written into the Moldovan Civil and Penal code, 
have been removed from many transition countries in Eastern Europe, often as a 
price for entry into the Council of Europe. Moldovan journalists lose 90% of the 
civil libel suits brought against them. (10) Such a high percentage prevents 
journalists from investigating many (especially criminal) cases and, as a 
consequence, the Moldovan population is deprived of an opportunity to obtain 
truthful information. Freedom House, a U.S.-based NGO, has ranked the 
Moldovan media as "Partly Free." The group stated that Moldovan journalists 
often engage in self-censorship and are frequently targeted for corruption and 
physical assault. (11) 
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BELARUS 
Unipendence celebration. 
Last Friday, Belarus festively celebrated the Russia-Belarus Unification Day (the 
8th anniversary of the Union's creation). This social event included the leaders of 
the Russia-Belarus Union state bodies, representatives of legislative and 
executive branches of power, researchers, intellectuals, youth organizations, etc. 
On Unification day, President Lukashenko congratulated the Belarussian people 
on this joyful event. (12) 
 
A different anniversary took place only a week before the Unification Day 
celebration, the 86th anniversary of the proclamation of the Belarussian People's 
Republic (a Belarussian state was proclaimed in 1918 but lasted for only three 
years). (13) Nothing close to festivities was noticed in the capital. On the 
contrary, those who came out to celebrate the Day of Freedom at Freedom 
Square were unceremoniously dispersed by the police. Other activists, who 
protested outside of Lukashenko's residence with posters which said: "Down with 
Lukashism!" and "Long Live Free Belarus!"were beaten by the police and taken 
into custody. 
 
One cannot help but wonder what kind of state Belarus is. Is it an independent 
state, where the people are prohibited to celebrate their independence or is it a 
unified state (with Russia), where the authorities are unwilling to give up their 
powers? It seems to be a unipendent state, which is being attacked from all sides 
by the Western community for actions similar to those used to suppress the rally 
on Freedom Day. Because of such actions, Belarus came under fire from 
numerous international organizations in the past several weeks. Recently, the 
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights delivered a report on the 
current situation in Belarus to the UN Commission on Human Rights during its 
60th meeting in Geneva. The report covered restrictions on freedom of 
expression and association, torture and inhumane treatment, denials of fair 
public trials, etc. (14) Amnesty International called on Belarussian authorities to 
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"stop intimidating human rights activists, end the practice of detaining people 
solely for the peaceful existence of their fundamental rights to freedom of 
expression and association." (15) 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
Armenia 
Another Rose Revolution? 
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The Armenian political opposition coalition, led by Justice alliance chair Stephan 
Demirchian and National Unity Party leader Artashes Geghamian, is gearing up 
for potentially violent confrontation with President Kocharian’s administration. 
The opposition coalition is planning to launch a "civil disobedience campaign" on 
12 April to protest the Kocharian administration’s refusal to organize a nationwide 
no-confidence referendum on the government’s performance. (1) The opposition 
is calling for the implementation of the Armenian Constitutional Court's ruling of 
16 April 2003, to hold a no-confidence referendum within a year’s time, which the 
Kocharian government has thus far ignored. (2) Demirchian and Geghamian 
openly dispute the results of the March 2003 presidential election, and therefore 
consider Kocharian’s government to be illegitimate. 
 
Tension between the political opposition and the Kocharian government began 
building in late March when Demirchian and Geghamian, the leaders of the 
country’s two main opposition groups, joined forces in a bid to encourage popular 
mass protests similar to the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia. The unprecedented 
union of the Armenian opposition movements accelerated the opposition’s plans 
to rally around the presidential palace and the nearby parliament compound in 
Yerevan on 12 April until Kocharian resigns. (3) In order to gather large crowds 
from the regions outside Yerevan, Demirchian and Geghamian have been 
campaigning and rallying, as indicated by the 28 March demonstration in Gyumri, 
for over a month. (4) 
 
Kocharian’s recent political rhetoric and intergovernmental maneuverings 
indicate that he takes the opposition threat seriously. On 24 March, Kocharian 
stated his readiness to use force against crowds rallying around his Yerevan 
residence, (5) while a 26 March statement by the three pro-presidential parties in 
the Armenian government warned that law enforcement bodies have a legitimate 
right to counter "attempts to violate the country’s constitutional law" with tough 
action. (6) In addition, on 31 March, Armenia’s Prosecutor General Aghvan 
Hovsepian, a Kocharian loyalist and recent appointment, opened a criminal 
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investigation into the Justice bloc’s recent organized protests, (7) which 
Demirchian denounced as an attempt at political persecution. (8) Kocharian has 
also been busy reshuffling Yerevan’s security and justice departments, as 
evidenced by his firing the majority of the district prosecutors in Yerevan and 
replacing the leadership in the Armenian police, in an attempt to consolidate 
power. (9) To counter recent opposition maneuvering, Kocharian’s administration 
undertook its own public relations campaign, with ministers dispatched to 
economically depressed rural areas to "present" the governments policies to 
potential voters. However, the popular discontent over the lack of economic and 
intellectual mobility, 55% of the population live in poverty, (10) coupled with the 
widespread political mobilization of the countryside by the opposition indicate that 
Kocharian’s government will have to fight to stay in power. 
 
Chechnya 
Ramzan Kadyrov, Akhmad Kadyrov’s son and head of the Chechen security 
service, made a surprising statement on 18 March in Nezavisimaya gazeta that 
the Chechen administration might grant amnesty to Aslan Maskhadov if he 
indicated a desire to join the Kadyrov administration. (11) Either Ramzan’s 
statement could be a flight of fancy or another indication of his father’s desire to 
consolidate power in Chechnya. In light of the recent wave of Chechen fighters 
surrendering to, or being captured by, Russian forces in hopes of gaining 
amnesty, such as the military commandant of the Nozhai-Yurt district, Boris 
Aidamirov, on 12 March, (12) Ickerian Defense Minister Mogamed Khambiev (13) 
and Chief of Maskhadov’s bodyguards Shaa Turlayev on 30 March, (14) Ahmad 
Kadyrov may have hopes of bringing as many separatist guerrillas into his own 
administration as possible. By gaining guerrilla support, Kadyrov could further 
strengthen his independence from Moscow. 
 
On 26 March, Kadyrov renewed his campaign to place all the counter terrorist 
operations in Chechnya under the control of his Interior Ministry, for the 
ostensible reason that a peaceful Chechnya can manage its own security 
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concerns. (15) In reality, Kadyrov hopes to wrest power from the Russian forces 
garrisoned in Chechnya, in order to consolidate all the military power within 
Chechnya into his own hands. 
 
However, in yet another sign that the Putin administration is sticking with its 
commitment to Kadyrov, the federal Auditing Chamber has made it clear that 
Kadyrov is not currently considered a suspect in the investigation into the misuse 
of over 5 billion rubles out of the 62 billion allocated to Chechnya since 2000. 
(16) The auditing investigation has targeted former Chechen Prime Minister 
Anatoli Popov as its scapegoat, as indicated by Auditing Chamber official Sergei 
Ryabukhin’s accusation that Popov maintained "zero-effectiveness" for 
Chechnya’s economy. (17) Kadyrov would not be a viable target for the auditing 
chamber, in any event, as he initiated the auditing investigation, while Sergei 
Abramov, who replaced Popov as Chechen Prime Minister, carried out the 
inspection. (18) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Agence France Presse, 30 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Associated Press, 25 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) Arminfo Yerevan, 30 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Arminfo News Agency, 23 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring, 24 Mar 04 via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(6) Public Television of Armenia, Yerevan, 29 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring, 30 Mar 
04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) Yerevan Itar-Tass, 1 Apr 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) Associated Press, 1 Apr 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) Arminfo News Agency, 19 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis; 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/articles/eav040104a.shtml; Arminfo News 
Agency, 22 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(10) World Bank Database Statistics by Country, Armenia, 4 Mar 04; 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=ARM&CC
ODE=ARM&CNAME=Armenia&PTYPE=CP. 
(11) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 Mar 04; via What the Paper’s say- Defense and 
Security, 22 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) Itar-Tass, 12 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) Agence France Presse, 9 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(14) Moscow Itar-Tass, 2 Apr 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) Itar-Tass, 26 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(16) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 Mar 04; What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(17) Moscow Times, 22 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(18) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 Mar 04; What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Bombings and (Possible) Related Events 
Between 28 March and 1 April, Uzbekistan has been subjected to a stream of 
terrorist attacks that have been met with a generous dose of speculation as to 
who is responsible for the attacks. No group has accepted responsibility, but the 
Uzbek government has been quick to blame Islamic militant groups. The region 
is in a heightened state of alert, and in the aftermath of the bombings the Uzbek 
government is moving to describe its situation as a victim without culpability. 
 
The context in which the bombings have taken place is complex, as are the 
possible motives behind the attacks as well as the problems that plague both the 
country and the region. It is significant to note that civilians do not appear to be 
the target of the attacks. 
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In an attempt to make sense of the string of events which have taken place, what 
follows is a chronological summary of recent events. (1) In brief, there are at 
least two reasons one can postulate for the bombings: 1) Islamic militants 
attempting to destabilize the region and undermine the authority of the Uzbek 
government as well as punishing it for its affiliation with the U.S. campaign 
against terror; and 2) an internal response directed at the police and security 
forces, which freely disregard human rights and are seen as oppressors of the 
population. While the latter of the two explanations is likely to figure heavily in the 
cause, the Uzbek government is likely to contextualize the bombings as part of 
the campaign of international terror, thereby encouraging the international 
community to overlook the stifling of rights and persecution of political opponents. 
Events leading up to the bombings support both explanations. 
 
19 March 
In light of what Kazakh and Tajik security sources perceived as increased activity 
by Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), marked primarily by an increase in the distribution of HT 
literature, Kyrgyzstan National Security Service Chairman, Kalyk Imankulov, 
indicated that Muslim clerics would have to play an essential role in the 
government’s campaign against HT. HT, which advocates the establishment of a 
caliphate in Central Asia, insists that their vision of the means to this end is a 
peaceful one. (2) 
 
20 March 
Pakistani forces conducting operations in the border area of South Waziristan 
(northwestern Pakistan) arrested over 100 terrorists, including Uzbeks, believed 
to be affiliated with al-Qa’ida. (3) 
 
22 March 
Russia announces that it will move Su-27 fighters to their newly opened airbase 
near Kant, Kyrgyzstan. According to Russian Air Force Commander-in-Chief 
Army General Vladimir Mikhailov, "We will reinforce our aircraft grouping in Kant 
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this summer… [by moving] four to eight multi-purpose aircraft to the Kant 
airbase," which currently has 20 aircraft. The reason given for doing this is a 
concern of a future increase in militant activity in the region. (4) 
 
25 March 
U.S. troops twice blocked the roads leading to Kyrgyzstan's Manas Airport (the 
main airport outside of Bishkek, which is also home of the international coalition 
at Ganci Airbase), due to "security-related incidents." (5) 
 
27 March 
Pakistani Major General Shaukat Sultan informs reporters that Tahir Yuldashev, 
head of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and a top leader of al-Qa’ida, 
was "injured along with his local facilitators in the ongoing military operation near 
Wana [South Waziristan]." (6) 
 
28 March 
Police beat to death a 78-year-old male vendor at the Chorsu market. (7) A bomb 
explodes in Qahramon, in the Bukhara region’s Romitantsky district. Terrorists 
were blown up while preparing a powerful bomb. (8) Ten people were killed, four 
detained, and according to Uzbek Prosecutor General Rashid Kadyrov, "law 
enforcement agencies confiscated 920 kilograms of explosives — mixture of 
saltpeter and aluminum powder." (9) Later, the reported amount of explosives 
found was increased to 1.5 tons. (10) 
 
29 March 
Two police officers were killed on the outskirts of Tashkent and a third was killed 
in the early morning (late night of the 28th) near the airport. The police officers’ 
weapons were stolen and the attackers escaped. (11) Around 8:20 am, local 
time, a female suicide bomber set off an explosion at the Chorsu market, near 
the Detskii Mir ("Children’s World") store, in Tashkent. (12) The explosion was 
near the police station, at the time of the morning police shift change. A second 
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(possibly female) suicide bomber detonated a bomb approximately 50 minutes 
later. Some have suggested that the timing of the second bombing emphasizes 
the police as the target; the second bombing came after the market had been 
cleared of bystanders. A third attack was described on the web site of "Muslim 
Uzbekistan," which claimed that a man "plung[ed] into [a group of] policemen and 
blew himself [up]," was unconfirmed. Some witnesses of the Chorsu market 
bombings mentioned the 28 March beating death and the police’s inhumane 
treatment of market workers, as just cause for targeting the police. (13) 
Numerous other bombs went off in Bukhara, with no casualties reported. (14) 
With as many as 19 dead, including six policemen, 11 suspects were detained by 
the Uzbek Interior Ministry. (15) 
 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan tightened security along their borders with Uzbekistan. 
(16) In response to accusations by the Uzbek government that HT was 
responsible for the bombings, a press release was issued by HT officials in 
London that "denies any involvement whatsoever in today’s [29 March] 
explosion." Imran Waheed, a spokesman for HT, went on to add that "the finger 
of blame for these explosions must point at the tyrannical Uzbek regime which 
has orchestrated such events in the past in order to suppress legitimate Islamic 
political opposition." (17) (Here, Waheed is referencing the February 1999 
Tashkent bombings, which some accused the Uzbek government of having 
staged. The IMU was officially blamed for the bombings and what followed was 
an increase of repressive measures taken against practicing Muslims in 
Uzbekistan who were labeled as threats to the state.) 
 
Uzbek Foreign Minister Sadyk Safayev tried to connect the Bukhara and 
Tashkent attacks with international terrorism: "A mean hand that is characteristic 
for terrorist acts stresses one more time that it is tested abroad. This hand is well 
known in various countries of the world." (18) 
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CSTO security chief scheduled meetings of the Collective Security Council 
(CSC) and the CSC offers Uzbekistan help after the terrorist attacks. (19) Russia 
encourages the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to increase its anti-
terrorist efforts. (20) U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says, 
"The attacks are yet another example of the importance of continued cooperation 
against those who would stop at nothing to achieve their misguided goals." (21) 
 
30 March 
In the morning, in the Kibrai district of the Tashkent region, explosive devices 
were detonated near a police traffic post. After the explosion, gunfire was 
exchanged between the police and the terrorists. (22) Simultaneously, a minibus 
exploded in the Bostanlyk district of the Tashkent region, near the Charvaksy 
water reservoir. Were the Charvaksy dam to break, the capital would be flooded. 
(23) 
 
Another female suicide attacker detonated a bomb in the Yalangach residential 
area in the Qibray district of the Tashkent region. (24) 
 
Near the TTZ tractor plant, a prolonged gun battle took place and witnesses 
claimed that people involved in the battle were wearing hijabs and headbands 
with Arabic inscriptions. It was later discovered that militants killed in the gun 
battle were using weapons stolen from police on the early morning of the 29th 
(late night of the 28th). (25) Ten homemade bombs were confiscated in Toitep, in 
the Tashkent region. (26) Twenty suicide bombers blew themselves up as police 
tried to detain them. (27) 
 
Uzbekistan reported that over the two days, 22 were killed, including ten 
policemen, and 30 were wounded. (28) The suicide bombers appear not to be 
counted in the official statistics. 
 
31 March 
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An explosion, the sixth in three days, took place at an apartment building in 
Andijan. The cause of the blast was unclear, but it was initially believed to be 
either an accidental gas explosion or terrorist act connected with the acts of the 
previous two days. (29) The blast was later attributed to a faulty gas line, though 
there were unconfirmed reports that members of the Uzbek military used the 
house. (30) Another explosion occurred in the southwestern part of Tashkent. 
(31) 
 
A hostage situation took place in the old district of Tashkent. An unidentified 
gunman took hostages in a private house and refused to negotiate with police. 
Eventually, the hostages were released and the gunman committed suicide. (32) 
 
Uzbek officials detained around 50 suspects, described by the government as 
"Wahhabis." Uzbek President Islam Karimov declared the attacks part of an 
international conspiracy of Islamic terrorists. (33) 
 
1 April 
Ending a standoff that began on 31 March in the Sabir-Rakhimov district of 
Tashkent, a suspected militant blew himself up in the early morning hours. (34) In 
Bukhara, a woman reportedly detonated a bomb in a two-story building, injuring 
herself and killing another. (35) 
 
Timing and Implications 
In the early part of March, Uzbekistan began mounting a propaganda campaign 
against HT. (36) The bombings come at a time when the CSTO and many in the 
region, speak of cooperation and the improved integration of security forces. (37) 
Furthermore, it is just after the publication of reports by the International Crisis 
Group and Human Rights Watch criticizing the conditions and abuses of human 
rights in Uzbekistan. (38) It also comes before the U.S. is to consider renewing 
assistance programs to Uzbekistan worth over $50 million. In order to do this, the 
Bush administration would have to waive the human rights conditions required for 
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receiving assistance. (39) As Uzbekistan plays an integral role in the U.S. 
campaign in Afghanistan, the decision is certain to come at some cost to the 
Bush administration. 
 
One market vendor, commenting on the attacks, claimed that "people see no 
legal way to make an honest living. They are desperate." (40) After the Tashkent 
bombings in February 1999, the government were overly aggressive in their 
attack on Islam and, according to Human Rights Watch, over 7000 Muslims were 
imprisoned over the five year period. (41) It is likely that the recent attacks will 
encourage Uzbek authorities to increase their repressive handling of religious 
and political opposition. 
 
At least 47 individuals were killed in the attacks and Uzbek officials are 
examining religious literature found with the terrorists to determine their group 
affiliation. Officials claim that the terrorists were trained outside of the country 
and have tried to link the recent attacks to the militants along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border. (42) Any official report, however, is likely to down play the police 
as the target of the attacks and to ignore the popular dissatisfaction with 
government policies and police brutality. 
 
It is believed that the terrorist bombings will strengthen U.S.-Uzbek relations as 
collaborators in the war against terrorism and solidify the importance of groups 
like the CSC and the SCO. The Uzbek government has focused on the 
international coalition of countries joined in the fight against terrorism, which 
draws attention from the internal problems of the country and affords them the 
opportunity to sidestep needed reform. Without reform, however, such 
expressions of desperation are unlikely to be completely silenced. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Based on accounts available at the time of publication. 
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(2) It is estimated that Kyrgyzstan has between 2000 and 4000 members of HT. 
Over the past two years, however, close to 1500 HT activists have been brought 
before the Kyrgyz court system. Kabar News (Bishkek), 1700 GMT, 22 Mar 04; 
CEP20040322000147 via World News Connection. Throughout Central Asia, HT 
membership is banned for it allegedly being a terrorist organization. 
(3) Agence France Press (Hong Kong), 1311 GMT, 20 Mar 04; 
JPP20040320000054 via World News Connection. 
(4) The Russian airbase in Kant currently has around 20 aircraft, including An-24, 
An-26, L-39, Su-24, Su25, and Mi-8 helicopters. ITAR-TASS, 1348 GMT, 22 Mar 
04; CEP20040322000162 via World News Connection. 
(5) While the Ganci airbase remains the home of the seven country 
"international" anti-terrorists coalition forces, only U.S. forces remain stationed 
there. ITAR-TASS, 1430 GMT, 25 Mar 04; CEP20040325000334 via World 
News Connection. 
(6) Yuldashev was sentenced to death in abstention for his alleged role in the 
February 1999 Tashkent bombings and is believed to be close to Usama bin 
Ladin. Agence France Press (Hong Kong), 1753 GMT, 27 Mar 04; 
JPP20040327000053 via World News Connection. The 1999 Tashkent bombings 
were an impetus for further government crackdown on Islam in Uzbekistan. 
(7) Eurasianet, 30 Mar 04 via www.eurasianet.org; RFE/RL, 31 Mar 04 via 
www.rferl.org. 
(8) ITAR-TASS, 1135 GMT, 29 Mar 04; CEP20040329000146 via World News 
Connection. 
(9) ITAR-TASS, 1725 GMT, 29 Mar 04; CEP20040329000413 via World News 
Connection. 
(10) RFE/RL, 31 Mar 04, via www.rferl.org. 
(11) ITAR-TASS, 1440 GMT, 29 Mar 04; CEP20040329000325 via World News 
Connection. 
(12) ITAR-TASS, 0736 GMT, 29 Mar 04; CEP20040329000019 via World News 
Connection. 
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(13) One witness also referenced the inappropriate act of a police officer who 
violently kicked an elderly woman for not moving out of the way quickly enough. 
Eurasianet, 30 Mar 04, via www.eurasianet.org. 
(14) ITAR-TASS, 1647 GMT, 29 Mar 04; CEP20040329000337 via World News 
Connection. 
(15) ITAR-TASS, 1725 GMT, 29 Mar 04; CEP20040329000413 via World News 
Connection. 
(16) ITAR-TASS, 1445 GMT, 29 Mar 04; CEP20040329000304; 1640 GMT, 29 
Mar 04; CEP20040329000327 via World News Connection. 
(17) Agence France Press (Paris), 2123 GMT, 29 Mar 04; EUP20040330000008 
via World News Connection. 
(18) ITAR-TASS, 1648 GMT, 29 Mar 04; CEP20040329000335 via World News 
Connection. 
(19) ITAR-TASS, 2001 GMT, 29 Mar 04; CEP20040329000423 via World News 
Connection. 
(20) The SCO includes: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan. ITAR-TASS, 1640 GMT, 29 Mar 04; CEP20040329000313 via World 
News Connection. 
(21) Eurasianet, 30 Mar 04 via www.eurasianet.org. 
(22) ITAR-TASS, 1125 GMT, 30 Mar 04; CEP20040330000113 via World News 
Connection. 
(23) ITAR-TASS, 1125 GMT, 30 Mar 04; CEP20040330000113 via World News 
Connection. 
(24) ITAR-TASS, 1534 GMT, 30 Mar 04; CEP20040330000321 via World News 
Connection. 
(25) Eurasianet, 31 Mar 04 via www.eurasianet.org. 
(26) ITAR-TASS, 1524 GMT, 31 Mar 04; CEP20040331000262 via World News 
Connection. 
(27) ITAR-TASS, 1555 GMT, 30 Mar 04; CEP20040330000327 via World News 
Connection; Kazakhstan Today, 31 Mar 04 via www.times.kg. 
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(28) ITAR-TASS, 1524 GMT, 31 Mar 04; CEP20040331000262 via World News 
Connection. 
(29) ITAR-TASS, 1525 GMT, 31 Mar 04; CEP20040331000264 via World News 
Connection. 
(30) Eurasianet, 31 Mar 04 via www.eurasianet.org. 
(31) ITAR-TASS, 1624 GMT, 31 Mar 04; CEP20040331000314 via World News 
Connection. 
(32) ITAR-TASS, 1945 GMT, 31 Mar 04; CEP20040331000415; 2137 GMT, 31 
Mar 04; CEP20040331000440 via World News Connection 
(33) Eurasianet, 31 Mar 04 via www.eurasianet.org. 
(34) Eurasianet, 1 Apr 04 via www.eurasianet.org. 
(35) Eurasianet, 1 Apr 04 via www.eurasianet.org. 
(36) Eurasianet, 30 Mar 04 via www.eurasianet.org. 
(37) The CSTO includes: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
and Tajikistan. Nikolai Bordyuzha, CSTO Secretary General, recently told reports 
"we have attained a very high level of integration with the Eurasian Economic 
Community and currently establish close ties with the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (CSO), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the United Nations." ITAR-TASS, 0933 GMT, 26 Mar 04; 
CEP20040326000068 via World News Connection 
One implication of this is that as countries become increasingly integrated in their 
security relations and in their cooperation against "terrorism", there is less 
objectivity and criticism of actions by member countries of the very conditions 
which contribute to the terrorism. 
(38) See International Crisis Group, "Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan: Ways 
Forward for the International Community," 11 Mar 04, via 
www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=2537&l=1; and Human Rights Watch, 
"Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan", Mar 04 via 
www.hrw.org/reports/2004/uzbekistan0304/. 
(39) RFE/RL, 31 Mar 04 via www.rferl.org. 
(40) Eurasianet, 30 Mar 04 via www.eurasianet.org. 
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(41) See Human Rights Watch, "Creating Enemies of the State: Religious 
Persecution in Uzbekistan," Mar 04 via 
www.hrw.org/reports/2004/uzbekistan0304/. 
(42) Moscow Times, 5 Apr 04 via www.times.kg. 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2004 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol9/ed0906.html. 
